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1. INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research
Reactor has now been modified as described in the Safety
Analysis Report for the MITR-II, Report MITNE 115. The
pre-operational testing and start-up to the nominal "5 Mw"
regular operation was extended over a two-year period
from about January of 1975 to December 20, 1976. The first
criticality was successfully achieved on August 14, 1975.
The results of the first critical experiments were used to
prepare the core configuration for initial operation; this
initial operating core is designated as Core I.
During the stepwise power testing of Core I in December
1975 and January 1976, several difficulties were encountered
that led to new minor design modifications. Since completion
of these design modifications was a time consuming project,
it was decided in February 1976 to refuel the core and
operate it in a manner shown to be satisfactory for 2.5 Mw
operation (half power) while the new components were being
prepared. This interim operation is called Core II, and
the core was operated successfully until shutdown for the
installation of the new components starting on November 1,
1976.
During November, Core III was installed and initial
criticality tests were completed. These tests proved that
the core configuration was similar to Core I with respect
to power distribution and calibrations and Core III was
projected to be satisfactory for 5 Mw operation. At that
point in time, in Mid-November, it was decided that more util-
ization of the reactor could be expected if a larger number of
"in-core" irradiation positions were available than the two
positions afforded by the Core III configuration. To provide
this additional flexibility another core configuration was de-
signed, and is designated as Core IV. This Core IV provides
the potential for four "in-core" irradiation positions. The
added in-core flexibility results in a reduction in the beam
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port flux enhancement. Core IV is the final core used during
the start-up and stepwise power testing; it is the base con-
figuration for regular 5 Mw operation.
In compliance with Section 7.13.4 of the Technical
Specifications for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Research Reactor, this start-up report has been prepared. The
report is divided into three major parts. First, the pre-
operational tests are outlined which were designed to determine
that the reactor and its associated facilities were constructed
in accordance with the M.I.T. plans for the reactor as pre-
sented in the Safety Analysis Report and that operation in
accordance with the Technical Specifications would occur.
Second, the critical experiments for the several core config-
urations are described. Third, a series of experiments are
described which determine the neutron characteristics of the
reactor and demonstrate that the requirements of the Technical
Specifications and Safety Analysis Report were satisfied.
The basic operating rules that were used during the
start-up period were as follows:
1. The provisions of Section 13, "Conduct of Operation",
in the SAR were followed during the start-up program.
The pre-operational testing, critical experiments,
and start-up experiments plans and acceptance criteria
were reviewed and approved by the operating staff
and by the M.I.T. Reactor Safeguard Committee.
2. A complete start-up check of the safety systems was
made before commencing criticality or start-up experi-
ments if the reactor was shutdown more than 16 hours,
in compliance with the technical specifications and
the operating procedures for the given planned oper-
ation.
3. In general, materials added to the reactor for experi-
ments were not removable while the reactor was critical
with the exception of the Pu-Be neutron source. For
special experiments in which changes in apparatus were
made while the reactor was critical, positive reactivity
changes were less than the amount required to cause
the reactor power level to rise on a 20 second
steady period.
4. The total excess reactivity loaded into the reactor
at any time did not exceed the Technical Specification
limit that the reactor must be able to be made sub-
critical using shim blades by at least 1% Ak/k from
the cold, Xe free critical condition with the most
reactive operable blade and the regulating rod fully
withdrawn.
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2. Pre-operational Tests
Pre-operational tests were those tests conducted to verify
that (1) safety systems and equipment were functioning as
designed, for the protection of the general public (2) safety
equipment was functioning as designed, for the protection of
the operators (3) systems and equipment were functioning so
that plant operations will meet design requirements and (4) sys-
tems and equipment were functioning in an efficient and con-
venient manner.
Pre-operational Test Procedures for MITR-II were prepared
by various sources; reactor supervisors, technical assistants,
operators, etc. Class A procedures within the meaning of
MITR-II Procedure Manual Section 1.4 were reviewed, approved,
and changed in accordance with that section and as described
in more detail below. Pre-operational Tests consisted of the
Purpose, Specifications, Acceptance Criteria, Special Test
Equipment (other than that used for normal surveillance tests),
Special Precautions and a Test Summary. The Pre-operational
Test Procedures which were Class A did not contain the
executable steps. Executable steps were contained in sub-
procedures, which were in effect detailed checklists. The
subprocedures were Class B and were reviewed and approved
accordingly.
Procedures (Class A) were prepared, distributed under cover
of a Safety Review Form to required parties, and comments re-
ceived. The procedure, and significant comments from all re-
viewers, were reviewed by all involved in the approval so that
each was aware of the comments and agreed to any changes. The
procedure was then typed in final form and routed with the
Safety Review Form for signatures. When signatures were re-
ceived, the procedure was submitted to the MIT Reactor
Safeguards Committee for review and approval. When approved,
the procedure was released for preparation of sub-
procedures (Class B) which were routed under Safety Review Forms.
Pre-operational tests for MITR-II were conducted only by
or under the supervision of licensed operators assisted by the
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experienced staff, maintenance personnel and RPO personnel
as required.
Pre-operational tests required "verification" of steps.
This meant that the person signing the step had actually
performed the step himself or was in a position to observe
the actions taken and results of the action.
Pre-operational Tests were reviewed in every detail when
complete, and before the system was designated operational.
It was expected that quite a few changes might be required
in various procedures and subprocedures when they were con-
ducted, to suit the plant, schedule, and/or test equipment
conditions at the time. The method for changing approved
Class A or B documents was followed, as appropriate, and
the actual steps performed were written into the subprocedure.
When completed, the tests with the results achieved, any
changes made, and all original and transcribed data was re-
viewed by two Senior Reactor Operators and accepted by the
Director or Co-Director.
The Pre-operational Test documents reviewed were the
originals that were used to conduct the test and record the
raw data directly.
For MITR-II, not every plant system was changed. For
those not changed, no pre-operational test was written. The
designated surveillance tests were conducted.
Results of pre-operational tests of MITR-II systems are
summarized in the following sections.
-6-
2.1 Process Systems
Leak checking and performance testing of the process
systems was completed to insure that the process systems would
operate as designed. Numbers in parenthesis reference the
applicable pre-operational procedure.
2.1.1 Primary H20 system (4.1.1)
The integrity (4.1.1.1) of the primary system was verified
by hydrostatically testing the primary piping to 60 psig
(Technical Specification 5.3). The system operability (4.1.1.2)
was shown to meet the following criteria:
1. System delivers at least 1900 gpm.
2. Shutdown heat removal flow is at least 7 gpm.
3. Core spray flow sufficient to give 0.37 gpm (1/27 of
10 gpm) in each fuel position.
4. Anti-syphon and convection valves operable.
S. Cleanup system maintains < 2 ymho/cm conductivity
6. Sample system operative.
7. Emergency cooling operable in all modes.
8. Off gas system flow rate > 5 cfm.
The primary system temperature instrumentation (4.1.1.3)
was calibrated to the following limits:
1. Temperature indicating instruments within + 2*C of
true temperature over operating range.
2. Core AT probes indicate within + 0.2*C of the true
temperature difference over operating range.
The primary flow recorder (4.1.1.4) was calibrated to
indicate the true flow within + 2% full scale over the range
from the scram point to the normal operating flow. The flow
pressure instrumentation (4.1.1.5) was calibrated to within
5% of the true pressure value over the instrument's full
range. Calibration curves of sightglass levels (4.1.1.6) were
determined as water was charged to the primary system.
Primary coolant system scrams and alarms (4.1.1.7) met
the following criteria:
1. Low level main tank alarms and scrams at -3.0 + 1.0
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inches from overflow.
2. Primary coolant flow instruments scram and alarm at
low setting > 1850 gpm.
3. High temperature reactor outlet thermoswitches alarm
and scram the reactor at 55 + 2*C.
4. High temperature reactor outlet recorded instrument
alarms at 53 + 20C and scrams the reactor at 55 + 20C.
5. Primary coolant flow scrams and high outlet temper-
ature scrams response is less than 1.0 sec. for 80%
of full insertion of each control blade.
6. Grid latch scram operable.
7. Low flow auxiliary pump alarms at 1.5 + 0.3 gpm.
8. No overflow core tank alarm operable.
9. High temperature primary cleanup system alarms at
50 + 20C.
10. High temperature heat exchanger outlet alarms annun-
unciate at 46 + 20C.
11. High pressure core inlet alarms at 27 + 2 psig.
12. Specific conductance alarms at 2 + 0.2 ymho/cm.
13. Low level storage tank alarms at 300 + 30 gals.
14. Leak tapes verified operable.
The following primary system interlocks were shown to be
operable (4.1.1.8):
1. Core purge system blowers stops and isolation valves
close on high radiation alarm.from purge gas radia-
tion monitor.
2. Main coolant pumps will not operate when Hold-Down
Grid Plate latch is released.
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2.1.2 D 20 Reflector System (4.1.2)
The integrity of the D2 0 system (4.1.2.1) was verified
by hydrostatically testing the D 20 system to at least 150%
of the maximum pressure at which the system is designed to
operate. The D20 fluid system was divided into three sections
tested at the following pressures:
1. Reflector tank and piping to equipment room @ 20 psig;
2. DM-l discharge and D 20 heat exchanger @ 60 psig;
3. Balance of D20 piping @ 40 psig.
The operability (4.1.2.2) of the D20 system was verified
to meet the following limits:
1. System cooling flow must be at least 200 gpm.
2. System must maintain level at overflow.
3. Cleanup system must lower conductivity to at least
0.4 ymho/cm for D20.
4. Dump system must lower reflector at least 24 inches
in < 25 seconds.
The temperature, flow, pressure, and level instrumentation
(4.1.2.3,4.1.2.4,4.1.2.5,4.1.2.6) were calibrated to within the
same limits as the primary system.
The scram and alarm points (4.1.1.7) of the D20 system
were within the following limits:
1. The low Flow Reflector Coolant Scram and Alarm is set
at > 150 gpm.
2. The low Level D20 Reflector Scram and Alarm is set at
-3 + 1 inches.
3. The Low Flow D20 Transfer Pump Alarm is set at 1.5 + 0.3
gpm.
4. The No Overflow D20 Reflector Alarm annunciated when
overflow is stopped.
5. The High Temperature Reflector Outlet Alarm is set at
55 + 20C.
6. The High Temperature D20 Cleanup System Alarm is set
at 50 + 20C.
7. The High D2 0 System Specific Conductance Alarm is set
at 0.4 + 0.1 ymho.
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8. The Low Level D20 Dump Tank Alarm annunciates at the
value set by the movable pointer.
9. The Low Pressure Dump Valve Alarm is set at 60 + 5 psig.
10. The reactor scrams when the dump valve leaves the
closed position.
11. All reflector system leak tapes operable.
The following interlocks (4.1.2.8) were verified to exist
in the D20 system.
1. When the dump valve leaves the closed position, the
transfer pump (DM-2) is de-energized.
2. When the level probe in the bottom of the dump tank
is uncovered, the transfer pump (DM-2) is de-energized.
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2.1.3 Secondary H20 (4.1.3)
The secondary H20 system was verified to meet the follow-
ing criteria (4.1.3.1):
1. System Satisfactory leak tight.
2. Flows to the following components verified as follows:
HE-1 -- 800 + 50 gpm.
HE-lA -- 800 + 50 gpm.
HE-3 > 80 gpm.
HE-4
HE-D-1 >-
HE-D-2 - 100 gpm.
HE-2 -- > 30 gpm.
3. Chemical addition system, and cooling tower satis-
factorily operable.
4. Flow through each water monitor > 2 gpm.
The temperature, flow, and pressure instruments were
calibrated to the same limits as the primary H20 system (4.1.3.2,
4.1.3.3,4.1.3.4)
The scram and alarm setpoints met the following limits
(4.1.3.5):
1. Low secondary flow alarms and scrams the reactor at
>650 gpm.
2. Low level cooling tower basins alarms at greater or
equal to 4 inches below overflow.
3. Low temperature cooling tower basins alarm at 100 + 20C.
The following interlocks were verified to exist on the
H20 secondary coolant system:
1. A discharge pressure of less than 6 psig at the dis-
charge of a cooling tower booster pump will stop the
pump.
2. The cooling tower outlet temperature will alarm and
stop both main secondary pumps at > 6*C and the inter-
lock bypass switch is operable.
4. The vibration switch on the cooling tower fan is
operable.
-11-
2.1.4 Graphite Helium System (4.1.4)
The graphite helium system was verified to meet the
following criteria (4.1.4.1):
1. The gasholder functions properly in its normal
operating condition to supply helium to the graphite
reflector region.
2. Air content of the graphite reflector region should
be such that:
E # refills/day x 20 cu. ft./refill x % air in sample
of gas from reflector region.
< 21 cu. ft./day
3. The oil seal is filled to the level determined by SV-13.
The graphite helium alarms and interlocks were verified
to meet the following limits:
1. High pressure graphite helium alarm annunciates at
2 + 0.3 inches of water.
2. Low pressure graphite helium alarm annunciates at 0.4
+ 0.2 inches of water.
33. The gasholder receives a fill signal at 20 + 5 ft and
a stop fill signal at 40 + 5 ft3.
4. The gasholder solenoid relief valve opens at a level
of 80 + 5 ft3.
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2.1.5 D20 Helium Cover System (4.1.2) (4.1.7)
The integrity of the D20 helium system was verified by
a 10 psig pneumatic test (4.1.2.1). The operability (4.1.2.2)
of the D20 helium system was verified to meet the following
limits:
1. Maintains system pressure at 2 + 1 in. of water.
2. System overall leakage as indicated by gasholder
recorder is < 10 ft3 per day.
3. Recombiner flow is > 2 cfm.
4. Oil seal leg is filled to a level determined by GV-46.
The alarm points (4.1.2.7) of the D20 helium system were
within the following limits:
1. The High Pressure D20 Helium System Alarm is set at
2.5 + 0.5 inches H20.
2. The Low Pressure D20 Helium System Alarm is set at
0.4 + 0.1 inches H 20.
3. The High Level D20 Helium System Alarm is set at
60 + 5 ft3.
34. The Low Level D20 Helium System Alarm is set at 8 + 2 ft3 .
The following interlocks (4.1.2.8) were verified to exist
in the D20 helium system.
1. The gasholder relief valve opens at a level of 80 + 5 ft3
2. The gasholder received a fill signal at 20 + 5 ft3 and
stop fill at 40 + 5 ft3
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2.1.6 D 20 Shutter System (4.1.2) (4.1.6)
The integrity of the D20 shutter system was verified at
the same time as the D20 system. The operability of the D20
shutter system was verified to meet the following require-
ments:
1. System functions to empty and refill the shutter tank
in response to controls.
2. "No Overflow Reflector Tank" alarm does not activate
when the shutter tank is drained and refilled.
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2.1.7 H 20 Shutter System (4.1.5)
The H20 shutter system met the following criteria:
1. System can fill and drain H20 shutter.
2. Main coolant system supplies cooling water con-
tinuously when shutter is closed.
3. Leakage less than 2 inches of gasholder level per
day.
H20 shutter system pressure and temperature instrumen-
tation was required to meet primary H20 acceptance criteria.
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2.1.8 Shield Coolant System (4.1.8)
The shield coolant system was verified operable and able
to meet the following criteria:
1. System modifications verified leak tight.
2. Flow equal to amount for MITR-I delivered to each
section.
3. Water purity maintained by ion column; ppm chloride
less than 10; pH = 7.0 + 0.5; conductivity < 50 ymho.
The temperature and pressure instrumentation were cali-
brated to within the limits set for the primary coolant system.
Alarms and scrams were set as follows:
1. The temperature alarm annunciates between 45 and 49*C.
2. The low level shield coolant tank alarm is operable.
3. The flow points are set at 60 gpm or above.
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2.1.9 Experimental Coolant System
The experimental coolant system has not been installed in
the MITR-II. Deletion of this system at the present time
creates no safety problem for the MITR-II since the operation
of the experimental cooling system was only a convenience to
experimenters. If the system is installed at a future date
it will be appropriately tested at that time.
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2.1.10 Makeup Water System (4.1.9)
A makeup water system was added to the list of reactor
auxiliary systems to provide a source of demineralized make-
up water for the reactor. The makeup water system operation
was verified to meet the following criteria:
1. System is leak tight.
2. Controls properly functional.
3. Water of <1 pmho/cm, pH = 6.5 + 0.5, Cl < 10 ppm free
of suspended solids and oil delivered to required points.
Alarms and interlocks on the system performed as follows:
1. The following conditions must be met in order to open
the solenoid fill valve; storage tank level below
alarm point, leak alarm clear, conductivity of storage
tank inlet water less than alarm point, water quality
meter on and proper range selected, storage tank inlet
conductivity probe selected.
2. Auxiliary pump will not run if its flow is less than
the alarm point (~.5 gpm).
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2.2 Performance Testing and Inspection of Reactor Control
and Instrumentation System
The following pre-operational tests of the reactor con-
trol and instrumentation system were performed to insure
compliance with the Technical Specifications.
2.2.1 Shim Safety and Control Elements (4.2.1)
Prior to initial fuel loading, the shim safety and control
elements were tested to demonstrate that they would operate
successfully. Shim blade controls and interlocks operated as
specified and shim blade and regulating rod position indica-
tion and drive speed was verified. Blade drop time tests were
performed both with main coolant pumps operating and shutdown.
Blades one through five passed the acceptance criteria that
the blade drop time from full out to 80% insertion be less than
0.7 seconds. For blade six the overall response time from full
out to 80% inserted always met the less than 1 second time
criteria of the Technical Specifications. Neutron transmission
tests were made to verify that the shim blades contained
neutron absorbing material.
As operating experience developed with the control blade
system, the blade absorbing material, blade outlimits, and con-
trol blade drive internals have been changed. These changes
have been made to improve the operation of the control blade
system and all changes were made in such a manner that the
requirements of the acceptance criteria and the Technical
Specifications were always met.
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2.2.2 Nuclear Instrumentation (4.2.2)
Tests of the nuclear instrumentation were performed and
the following criteria were satisfied:
1. Neutron Detector response to neutron source within + 50%
of response calculated by multiplying measured flux by
detector manufacturer's sensitivity specification.
2. Neutron Detectors respond to neutron source within ex-
pected range based on the neutron flux estimate.
3. Log N Meters (DC) - Response within + 4% full scale
10ll to 10~4 amperes.
4. Log Count Rate Meters - Response within + 4% full scale
from 1 cps to 104 cps.
5. Level scram occurs within + 10% of set point.
6. Period scram occurs between 12.3 and 9.9 seconds within
nominal scram setting of 11 seconds.
7. Reactor scrams if two period channels level indications
offscale.
8. Reactor scrams when each neutron detector high voltage
is decreased to 350 volts.
9. All scrams response times to be less than 1 second in-
cluding control blade drop to 80% insertion.
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2.2.3 Process System Controls and Instrumentation
Process system controls and instrumentation were success-
fully tested and calibrated as part of the pre-operational
test of each respective process system.
2.2.4 Radiation Monitoring System (4.2.3)
Pre-operational tests of the radiation monitoring system
verified that the following acceptance criteria were satisfied:
A. Reactor Area Monitors (4.2.3.1)
1. Accuracy is within the range corresponding to + 75 %
of the full scale meter movement.
B. Environmental Monitors (4.2.3.2)
1. The system is capable of.detecting background
radiations when the reactor is not operating.
C. Secondary Water and Sewer Monitors (4.2.3.3)
1. Sewer: to be capable of detecting a concentration
that exceeds the limits of 10 CFR Part 20
for discharge of 60Co into the sewer system.
2. Water: to be capable of detecting a concentration
of 10-3 PCi/ml of 24Na.
D. Effluent Monitor Detectors (4.2.3.4,4.2.3.6)
1. Accuracy is within the range corresponding to + 7%
of the full scale meter movement.
2. No paralyzation, at dose rates equal to that expected,
in the design basis accident (100 R/hr).
3. Each plenum monitor closes the dampers on a high
radiation signal.
4. The time for the plenum radiation trip, including
sample transit and ventilation damper closing time
shall be less than the time for effluent air to
flow from the sampling point to the damper.
E. Fuel Vault Monitor (4.2.3.5)
Instrument measures radiation levels as specified in
the Code of Federal Regulations - Title 10, Part 70
for criticality monitoring method.
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F. Radiation Monitor Alarms (4.2.3.7)
1. All radiation monitors alarm in the control room
on a high radiation signal.
2. All local radiation alarms and lights are operable.
G. Trouble Radiation Monitor Alarms (4.2.3.7)
1. The following conditions cause a trouble radiation
monitor alarm:
a) low level on any effluent monitor
b) any effluent monitor not set in counting mode
c) stack gas No. 2 or particulate No. 2 not on
proper range
d) loss of flow to either secondary water monitor
e) loss of flow to any gaseoud effluent monitor
2. The ventilation closes on a loss of flow to any
plenum monitor.
H. Fuel Vault Alarm and NW12 Evacuation Signal.
1. Fuel vault local and control room alarms operation
verified.
2. Operation of NW12 evacuation horns and lights
verified.
I. Core Purge Gas Monitor
1. Accuracy is within the range corresponding to
+ 7% of the full meter movement.
2. No paralyzation, at dose rates equal to that ex-
pected, in the design basis accident (100 R/hr).
3. Capable of detecting a concentration that exceeds
25% of the permissible discharge concentration
from the reactor exhaust system.
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2.3 Performance Testing and Inspection of the Reactor Building
and Facilities
Testing and Inspection of the reactor building and facil-
ities verified that the building containment is adequate and
that the facilities are satisfactorily operable.
2.3.1 Reactor Building Enclosure (4.3.1)
The reactor building has been tested for leakage approxi-
mately annually from 1958 to 1974. Upon completion of the
containment modifications required by the construction of the
MITR-II the reactor building was pressure and leak tested using
the standard MITR surveillance procedure. The measured leak
rate satisfied the following criteria:
1. After at least four hours of measurements the measured
leak rate must be less than 97% permissible leak rate
as defined by the technical specifications (1% per day
per psig pressure) by at least two standard deviations.
Vacuum breakers are installed in the containment to prevent
an excess differential negative pressure between the contain-
ment interior and outside. The vacuum breakers were set to meet
the following criteria:
The maximum differential negative pressure required to
activate the outer vacuum breaker is both greater than
1.0" H20 and less than 1.7" H20 pressure. The maximum
differential negative pressure required to activate the
inner.vacuum breaker is both greater than 0.4" H20 and
less than 1.0" H20 pressure.
Alarms, scrams, and interlocks on the building enclosure
system satisfy the following criteria:
1. "Reactor Start" can be obtained only if the building
AP is negative and of magnitude greater than -0.10
inches of water.
2. The reactor will scram if:
a) The building pressure exceeds atnospheric pressure
by more than 3.0 inches of water
b) Air pressure is lost to both gaskets of either the
main or basement personnel locks.
-23-
3. An alarm annunciates when the pressure on either per-
sonnel lock air supply is less than 20 psig.
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2.3.2 Ventilation System (4.3.3)
The measured flow rate up the building stack exceeded
8000 feet of air per minute. Pre-operational tests verified
that the following interlocks on the ventilation system were
operable:
Required Conditions to
Interlock Clear and/or Activate
1. Main Fan Sequence
Interlock
2. Auxiliary Fans -
Exhause Fan
Interlock
3. Pneumatic Blowers -
Exhaust Fan Inter-
lock
4. Control Room Intake
Fan Interlock
5. Freeze-Up Control
6. Building AP Interlock
7. Intake Damper Low Oil
Pressure Interlock
8. Exhaust Damper Low Oil
Pressure Interlock
9. Intake Louvers Interlock
10. Main Damper - Auxiliary
Damper Interlock
11. Main Exhaust Damper -
Exhaust Fan
Intake fan must be oper-
ating for the exhaust fan
to operate
Auxiliary fans stop when
exhaust fan stops
Pneumatic blowers stop
when exhaust fan stops
Fan stops when intake fan
stops
Intake fan stops when tem-
perature of air leaving
preheat coils drops to
approximately 35*F
Intake fan stops if reactor
building vacuum exceeds 0.4
in. H20
Main intake damper closes
when oil pressure decreases
to approximately 600 psig
Main exhaust damper closes
when oil pressure decreases
to approximately 600 psig
Intake louvers open when
intake fan is started
If a main damper fails to
close on a radiation mon-
itor signal, the associated
auxiliary damper will close
after less than a 10 second
time delay
Exhaust fan stops when main
exhaust damper closes
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Interlock
12. Main Intake Damper -
Intake Fan
Required Conditions to
Clear and/or Activate
Intake fan stops when
main intake damper
closes
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2.3.4 Fuel Element Storage and Handling Equipment
Storage and handling of fuel was done in compliance
with Technical Specification Section 3.10. The new fuel
vault and spent fuel pool are the same facilities as used
by the MITR-I. The fuel storage ring in the reactor core
tank was constructed as part of quality assurance program
M-72-9 (core tank) and neutron transmission tests were
completed prior to its installation to insure that cadmium
was present. Fuel handling tools and the spent fuel transfer
flask are being constructed and modified under quality
assurance programs M-75-2 and M-76-ll respectively.
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2.3.3 Fire Alarm, Smoke Detector System, and Fire Extinguishers
(4.3.4,4.3.5)
An ionization smoke detector system was installed in the
reactor containment building. The smoke detector system
satisfied the following criteria:
1. The sensitivity of each ionization smoke detector
shall be between 15 and 80 volts (Manufacturer's
Specification).
2. When checked with the freon gas test device or suit-
able substitute, a smoke detector must initiate an
alarm signal.
There is a fire alarm system within the reactor contain-
ment. These alarms are annually operated and ring in the
reactor containment only. Fire alarm stations are located:
a) outside wall in basement set-up area near control
room door,
b) in the equipment room near the fuel storage room wall,
c) in the reactor room on the main floor near the per-
sonnel air lock,
Portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers are available
near the following locations:
a) outside the main personnel lock,
b) in the basement area near the stairs,
c) on the polar crane platform,
d) in the control room,
e) in the equipment room,
f) in the utilities room,
g) on the reactor floor,
Fire extinguishers listed above are:
a) in their proper location,
b) are properly charged and seals are intact,
c) have been hydrostatically tested within past 5 years,
d) appear uncorroded and undamaged.
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2.3.5 Emergency Power System
Pre-operational testing of the emergency power system
verified that the following equipment would operate for at
least one hour following loss of off-site power:
Primary H20 auxiliary pump
Radiation monitors
Annunciator system
Process system and radiation monitor recorders
T.V. monitor
Intercom
Evacuation alarm system
Emergency lighting
Experiment instrumentation (as required)
Miscellaneous power outlets and control systems.
-29-
2.3.6 Reactor Building Crane
The reactor building crane was not changed during the
modification. Inspection of the crane met the criteria of
MITR maintenance procedure 7.1.4 which are based on 29 CFR
1910.179 (J).
2.3.7 Waste Tank System
New above ground waste storage tanks were installed in-
side of the restricted area but outside of the containment
building. Pre-operational testing verified the system as
leak tight and operable as designed. The waste tank alarm
system satisfied the following criteria:
1. Level alarms before tank overflow.
2. Wetting of the leak tape will annunciate the alarm.
3. The temperature alarm annunciates between 32*F and
360 F.
4. The high radiation trip of the sewer monitor stops
the sewer pump.
5. High water level in the sump starts second pump.
6. Probe in sump annunciates leak alarm system.
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2.4 Fuel Element Inspection, Fuel Positioning Tests, and
Neutron Attenuation Checks of Neutron Absorbers
To assure the compatibility of the reactor core with the
present safety analysis, the fuel elements were inspected, fuel
positioning was verified, and the neutron attenuation of
neutron absorbers was checked.
2.4.1 Fuel Element Inspection (4.4.1)
Fuel for the initial core loading of the MITR-II was
procured under quality assurance program M-72-14. The fuel
consists of plates of uranium in the form of UAlx with a
nominal value of 36 W/% uranium-235 (90% enrichment) in
aluminum, clad by a layer of aluminum metal 0.015+0.015" thick.
-0. 005",
The fuel complies with the procurement specifications (M-72-14)
with the exception of deviations previously evaluated and docu-
mented in the Q/A files as acceptable for normal operation in
the reactor. The following fuel elements were limited to less
than full power because of procurement specification deviations:
1. 4M41 (Removable plate element) is limited to less
than 1.0 KW due to channel tolerances.
2. 4M06, 4M14, 4M32 are limited to less than 100 KW
pending future review of local fin damage. (Fins
are made by grooving the plate surface 0.010 inch-deep
and 0.010-inch wide spaced 0.010 inches apart.)
2.4.2 Neutron Absorber Attenuation (4.4.2)
Neutron attenuation tests of the control blades and the
fuel storage ring were discussed in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.4
respectively. The presence of neutron absorbing material (Cd)
in absorber spider was verified by neutron transmission tests
(comparison between neutron transmission through plates of
absorber spider and standard plates with and without cadmium).
-31-
2.4.3 Fuel Positioning Test (4.4.3)
To insure proper positioning of the fuel elements in
the reactor core and fuel storage rack, fuel positioning
tests were performed. Prior to installation of the core
housing and fuel storage ring in the core tank, the follow-
ing criteria were satisfied:
1. Fuel element dummies (MIT type) can be readily
loaded and unloaded through the upper grid plate
in all 27 fuel positions, and the core housing can
be filled with 27 dummies with no evidence of binding.
2. The upper grid plate rotates freely to all 27 positions
with no evidence of binding during the loading or un-
loading.
3. Fuel element dummies fit all positions in the storage
rack without binding.
4. Vertical movement of fuel elements in the core housing
is limited to 0.119 inches but at least 0.050 inches.
After installation of the core housing in the core tank,
proper fuel positioning was again verified by meeting the above
criteria number 1 and 2 using standard refueling procedures.
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2.5 Experimental Facility Tests and Inspections
Pre-operational testing of experimental facilities was
performed to insure safe useful operation of the reactor.
2.5.1 Port Alignments in the New D20 Reflector Tank
As part of the installation process of the D20 reflector
tank, considerable time was spent achieving the optimal align-
ment between the reflector tank reentrant thimbles and the
existing port thimbles. MITR drawing R3S-82-5 shows the orien-
tation between the reentrant thimbles and the port thimbles.
2.5.2 Port Shielding and Shutter Mechanisms (4.5.1)
The lead and boral shutters in the medical facility and
the steel doors in the lattice facility were unchanged from
MITR-I operation and were tested in the standard operating
procedure after reinstallation. The following were verified
as part of pre-operational testing:
1. Thermal column and medical therapy facilities shielded
as required for reactor startup operation.
2. Thermal column and and medical therapy facilities con-
trols, alarms, and interlocks, required for safe
reactor operation, are operable.
The adequacy of all shielding was checked during the
escalation to full power.
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2.6 Engineered Safeguards Tests
The engineered safeguards as described in SAR chapter 6
were tested and inspected during the pre-operational testing
and start-up period to insure that the requirements of the
SAR and Technical Specifications were satisfied.
2.6.1 Emergency Cooling
The primary method of shutdown and emergency cooling is to
cool the core by natural circulation. The complete loss of
coolant for natural circulation cooling requires a simultaneous
massive rupture of the core tank, reflector tank, and the graphite
reflector containment membrane. In the event of this extremely
unlikely situation, a redundant core spray system using city
water as a supply was installed. The acceptance criteria for
this system was that it be capable of delivering 0.37 GPM
(1/27 of 10 gpm) to each fuel position in order to satisfy the
SAR basis for minimum flow. A full size out-of-core test was
performed because it was not acceptable to spray city water
directly into the core tank for test purposes due to the possible
contamination of the primary system with chlorinated city water.
Tests were made to determine both the optimal spray nozzle
type and arrangement. Spray tests were performed at various
times and on various days to show that spray distributions
were insensitive to normal fluctuations in city water pressure.
However, if the make-up water to the cooling tower basins was
operating at the same time as the core spray then the spray
distribution and flow rate were adversely affected. Procedures
for operating this emergency cooling system now include pro-
vision for securing the cooling tower make-up flow. Tests
showed that the spray flow to all 27 fuel positions would be
greater than or equal to 0.37 gpm provided that the cooling
tower makeup water supply was secured and that the nozzle dis-
charge rate was given by normal city water pressure (greater
than 20.3 gallons/per minute).
-34-
2.6.2 'Syphon Breakers
In the unlikely event of the rupture of the inlet pipe
below the core level, two anti-syphon valves on the annular
partition would prevent any potential syphon action from un-
covering the core. The anti-syphon valves are held in the
closed position by main pump pressure in the inlet annulus.
When the main pumps are shutdown, the anti-syphon valves open
and would be able to vent any potential syphon. The valves
are visually inspected prior to each startup to insure proper
operation. Design modifications that were performed on the
natural circulation valves were also performed on the anti-
syphon valves to insure maximum reliability.
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2.6.3 Natural Circulation Valves
Four natural circulation valves are designed to open on
loss of primary pump pressure, thus providing a convection
loop system around the core. The initial design of the natural
circulation valves consisted of a moveable center spool inside
a cylindrical section. Pump pressure lifted the spool against
an angled seat at the top of the cylindrical section thus
closing the valve. Upon a loss of pump pressure the spool was
designed to drop by gravity and open the valve for natural
circulation cooling of the core. Pre-operational testing
showed that the valves would stick closed.100% of the time.
Since this was totally unacceptable, the valves were changed
to a more standard ball check valve in which a solid aluminum
ball replaced the spool piece and the seat angle was changed
slightly. The pressure drop characteristics for natural
circulation were unchanged. The natural circulation valves
were visually inspected prior to each startup to insure that
the valve had operated properly. After operation for several
months (following the pre-operational testing phase and well
into the start-up phase) sticking of the natural circulation
valves again became a problem when one valve was found stuck
shut. The new problems were diagnosed as an adverse friction
condition for the materials and seat angle of the second design.
The check valve seat material was changed to stainless steel
and the seat angle was adjusted to greatly reduce the probability
of the valve sticking. For the latter two designs, a valve
was tested for more than 1000 open-close cycles in a test loop
and then the flow leakage measured to insure that the valves
functioned properly and that bypass flow was small. For both
natural circulation valve -design changes, the NRC was notified
and the MITR Safeguards Committee approved the change. The
anti-syphon valves were a similar design to the natural cir-
culation valves, and the first anti-syphon valve design was
modified based on the initial natural circulation valve exper-
ience; also, one anti-syphon valve has been changed to a stain-
less steel seat even though these anti-siphon valves did
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not have a sticking problem.
The current design of the natural circulation valves
have been visually inspected at reactor start-up and shutdown.
2.6.4 Hold-Down Grid Plate
The hold-down grid plate is designed to lock down the
fuel elements during operation and prevent accidental dis-
assembly of the core by hydraulic lift if a main pump is
started during the refueling operation. An interlock system
requires that the reactor be shutdown with all control rods
in and the primary H20 pump be off before refueling can be
started, and conversely all the fuel must be secured in the
core before the hold-down plate interlock can be cleared to
allow primary pump start-upand control rod withdrawal.
The plate is normally locked in position by a grid latch;
this is mechanically operated from outside the tank, where it
is electrically interlocked with the reactor-start circuit
(reactor-start interlock). When the grid latch is moved,
the reactor is shutdown and, before the plate can be rotated,
the control rods must be fully down to provide required
clearance. As the plate is rotated, all fuel element positions
are individually exposed for fuel removal, but never more than
three elements can be removed from a single grid plate orien-
tation. Therefore, this is the maximum number that accidentally
could be discharged.
Pre-operational testing and operating experience verified
that the hold-down grid plate operates as designed.
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2.6.5 Pressure Relief System (4.3.2)
A pressure relief system was installed in the reactor
building as a means of lowering the building pressure in a
controlled manner if the building pressure should begin to
approach the design pressure or in the event that the radio-
activity in the building air is sampled and found to be low
but the building pressure is beginning to rise. Pre-operational
testing verified that the pressure relief system satisfied the
following criteria:
1. System, excluding filter housings, leak tight.
2. Filter housing assembly meets permissible leakage
rate of 0.01% of building volume per psi per day.
3. Filter assembly with charcoal filters meet spec-
ification of > 95% efficiency for the removal of
elemental iodine.
4. Filter assembly with absolute filters meet spec-
ification of 99.95% efficiency (Section 7.3 of
ORNL-NSIC-65) for the removal of 0.7 micron mean
diameter size particles.
5. Calibration curve for velocity meter on discharge
is generated.
6. Filter maximum flow rate of 1000 CFM at 2 psi is
not exceeded.
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2.7 Operator Retraining
The MITR-II Operating Manual was written by the licensed
reactor staff as a training exercise. Each chapter was assigned
to an Operator or Senior Operator or author and another licensed
person was assigned as primary reviewer. A lecture was given
on each chapter by the author and several quizzes were admin-
istered. Each chapter was given to all licensed personnel for
review and finally approved by the reactor superintendent, the
assistant director for operations and the reactor director.
The procedure manual was also written by the operations group
and issued under the Safety Review system so that all licensed
personnel received copies.
A final written examination was administered to all licensed
personnel except the senior review board. The exam was of the
same format and degree of difficulty as an NRC licensing exam
and served as the first annual examination under the retraining
program. The exam was graded by the senior review board that
assigned the necessary tutoring as per the retraining program.
Finally, an oral examination was given by the reactor
superintendent and assistant director for operations. The for-
mat of the oral exam was the same as used by the NRC but was in
more detail in that all reactor systems were covered.
The senior review board received all examinations and on
the job training records. The documented evaluation was used
to determine that Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Oper-
ators were qualified to perform their licensed duties on the
MITR-II.
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3. Criticality Studies
The first approach to critical was made after all pre-
operational testing required for operation less than 100 kw
had been satisfactorily completed. Special dummy orificed
fuel elements were installed in all positions of the core.
These were removed as each fuel element was installed, thus
all positions remained filled to align the fuel.
At the start of each new operating period,* a start-up
checksheet procedure was used to assure that:
1) reactor instruments are in their proper operating
condition,
2) the control and safety systems are operational,
3) and all safety trip settings are properly adjusted.
A Pu-Be neutron source was installed to provide the re-
quired instrument on-scale readings (the Pu-Be source was only
present in the core at powers less than 500 watts).
During the initial operation at power levels below 100 kw,
it was desirable to operate the reactor without running the
water recirculation systems. In order to withdraw the reg-
ulating rod and shim-safety blades in this condition, it was
necessary to bypass a number of the process system interlocks.
These interlocks did not affect the safety of the reactor at
low power operation. In order to bypass the primary coolant
flow, special low power safety channels were installed. There
were also experiments in which the level of the D20 was varied.
To do this, it was necessary to bypass the D20 level interlock
and the dump valve interlocks. All bypasses were clearly
indicated either by key switch or by tags. Information con-
cerning the bypasses was recorded in the log book and in the
bypass log at the time that the interlocks were bypassed and
when the bypasses were removed. All bypasses that were not
controlled by a key switch were recorded at the beginning of
each operating period.
* A new operating period is defined to begin after a reactor
shutdown of at least 16 hours. For shorter shutdowns, a modified
checksheet appropriate to the nature and amount of systems main-
tenance, deactivation or modification was performed.
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Four neutron detecting pulse counters were positioned in
various ports next to the reactor tank. One of these was
connected to a log CRM anda period amplifier set to scram the
reactor if the period becomes less than 10 seconds. Also, a
gamma compensated ion chamber which operated the log N amplifier
was set close to the core so that this system operated when the
reactor was critical. This channel was connected to the safety
circuit and would scram the reactor if the period became less
than 10 seconds. The safety channels that trip the shim-safety
blades at a pre-set power level were in operation. Any bypassing
of these safety channels was in accordance with the operating
rules of "at least two flux level and two period scrams must
be in service" with an on-scale signal for the period channels.
The procedure for the first approach to critical was the
standard technique involving plots of inverse counting rate
as the reactor fuel was loaded. Initial counting rates were
measured with no fuel in the reactor, the shim blades and reg-
ulating rod fully inserted and then fully withdrawn. Two one
curie plutonium-beryllium neutron sources were located in the
in-core sample assembly in the A-3 position. A fuel element
was then loaded in the core and counts on all four channels
were taken. The shim blades and the regulating rod were again
slowly withdrawn. The counting rates were measured and a plot
made of the inverse counting rate versus the number of fuel
elements loaded into the core. This plot was extrapolated after
each loading to determine the next safe fuel addition. The shim
blades and the regulating rod were in the "all-in" position
before any fuel additions were made. Fuel additions during
this first approach to critical were not to be more than one
fuel element at one time. The supervisor in charge of the
loading instructed the loading crew concerning the next safe
addition to be made, and each loading was checked. The upper
grid plate was latched and each element checked to assure that
it was securely locked in the correct position prior to the
start of each new approach-to-critical measurement.
The pattern for loading the fuel was kept symmetric. To
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develop the loading steps, attention was focused on the fact
that the design of the core is an undermoderated compact core
with a D20 reflector and with shim-safety blades at the core-
reflector interface. The fuel at the periphery of the core
was expected to be the most sensitive. The peripheral fuel
is also closest to the control system. The loading plan was
developed with the concept of, first, loading two elements around
the centrally located source to assure that the neutrons from
the source were multiplied by some fuel interactions before
they reach the detectors, and second: loading the peripheral
fuel (c-ring) to assure that the safety and control systems
were effective as the final approach to critical were made
with the inner, less effective, B-ring fuel elements.
The initial approach to critical was performed using
MITR-II start-up procedures 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. Procedure 5.1.1
is summarized as follows:
5.1.1 - Initial Fuel Loading
Purpose
1. To load fuel assemblies until the configuration is estim-
ated to be close to the critical configuration but more
than one assembly away from critical.
2. To perform absorber effectiveness measurements by sub-
critical multiplication measurements.
3. To perform fuel loading uniformity check by interchanging
random fuel elements.
4. To test reactivity change due to start-up Pu-Be neutron
source removal.
S. To perform miscellaneous reactivity measurements by sub-
critical multiplication measurements.
Acceptance Criteria
1. All absorbers are effective in controlling count rate.
2. Fuel assemblies appear uniformly loaded based on the spot
check performed.
3. The neutron source(s) to be used during future reactor
start-ups and removed from the core with the reactor critical
is estimated to cause a reactivity change of + 0.2% keff or
less.
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Results
1. Procedure was satisfactorily completed to within two
additional fuel elements required to be loaded for
criticality; the fuel loading plots gave conservative
extrapolations and became quite linear near the end of
the critical approach.
2. All absorbers were shown to be effective.
3. Fuel assembly loading were uniform within counting
statistics.
4. The source (Pu-Be) reactivity effect was negative and
less than 0.2% Keff.
5. An element loaded in the B-ring was shown to have a
slightly greater reactivity worth than an element in
the C-ring.
After showing that the effectiveness of the control and
safety systems was within the limits of the Technical Specifi-
cations, fuel loading continued under MITR start-up procedure
5.1.2. Procedure 5.1.2 is summarized as follows:
5.1.2 - Initial Criticality and
Absorbers Calibrations
Purpose
1. Load fuel until a critical configuration is achieved.
Achieve a self sustaining chain reaction for the first
time in this modified MIT reactor.
2. Load fuel until the core configuration is complete as
designed with the In-core Sample Assembly in place.
3. Determine that the fully loaded core will be safely
shutdown, as evidenced by the requirements of the shut-
down margin specified by Technical Specifications.
4. Perform repetitive fuel loadings and shutdown margin
determinations after changes to fixed cadmium absorbers,
as necessary to fulfill requirement #3, or to provide for
sufficient excess reactivity for operations.
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Acceptance Criteria
1. Shutdown margin of full core as loaded under cold clean
conditions, with the most reactive shim blade and regu-
lating rod withdrawn is 1% Ak/k or more.
2. Sufficient excess reactivity exists to conduct planned
operations. Critical shim bank height above 6.0 inches
and below 12.0 inches.
Results
1. The reactor was first made critical on August 14, 1975
with a loading of 20 fuel elements, six water-filled
dummy elements, and one incore sample assembly contain-
ing the Pu-Be source. The lower edge of the cadmium
fixed absorber was 14 inches above the bottom edge of
the fuel.
2. Reactor operation was always within the shutdown capab-
ility requirements.
3. Tests were completed to the point of deciding on the new
fixed cadmium absorber height and surplus water in the
core. Only 21 fuel elements could be loaded or the re-
quired shutdown margin would have been exceeded. Thus
it was decided to lower the bottom edge of the cadmium
absorber to 10 inches above the bottom of the fuel and
fill several of the water-filled dummy positions with solid
aluminum elements.
The initial core configuration was completely unloaded
and the fixed absorbers changed. The core was reloaded using
a modified procedure comparable to 5.1.2. The reloading pro-
cedure was MITR Start-up Procedure 5.1.3 and is summarized as
follows:
5.1.3 - Second Criticality and
Absorbers Calibrations
Purpose
1. Purpose same as procedure 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.
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Acceptance Criteria
1. Shutdown margin of full core as loaded under cold clean
conditions, with the most reactive shim blade and regu-
lating rod withdrawn is 1% Ak/k or more.
2. Sufficient excess reactivity exists to conduct planned
operations.
3. Critical shim bank height above 6.0 inches and below
12.0 inches.
Results
1. The core was made critical on September 8, 1975 with 22
fuel elements and was loaded to a final configuration of
24 fuel elements with 2 solid aluminum dummy elements
(B-2, B-8) and the in-core sample assembly (A-1).
2. The reactor operation was always within the shutdown
capability requirement.
3. The 24 element core-shim bank critical height was 7.36
inches.
4. Recording of blade friction measurement data was started
on the control blades.
The twenty-four element core with cadmium fixed absorbers
at 10 inches above the bottom of the core is hereafter called
Core I. Low power testing was completed and escalation to a
full power of 4.9 Mw was started (details of the test results
and power escalation results are included in the next section
of this report). Flow induced power fluctuations were noted
during the escalation to full power and after an attempt to
perform the 4.5 Mw step, it was decided to hold at a power of
less than 2.5 Mw using only one primary pump pending solution
to the power fluctuation problem. During this period of
steady-state operation at powers of less than 2.5 Mw, the problem
of cadmium sandwich swelling was discovered. As a result of
the tight tolerances in the compact MITR-II core, even a small
amount of fixed absorber swelling (>0.020 inches) can bind
fuel elements into the core. When numerous fuel elements were
found to be stuck, the core was defueled and all of the fixed
absorbers were removec. In order to be able to operate the
reactor during the time required to solve the cadmium sandwich
swelling problem, it was decided to operate the
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core without fixed absorbers and with additional solid
dummies. MITR Start-up procedure 5.1.4 was used for loading
the reactor core without fixed absorbers. The following
is a summary of 5.1.4:
5.1.4 - Fuel Loading After Removal
of the Fixed Absorbers
Purpose
1. To load fuel in a safe manner until a critical configur-
ation is reached.
2. To load a full core with fuel assemblies and solid alum-
inum assemblies in place and perhaps an in-core sample
assembly.
3. Determine that the fully loaded core will be safely shut-
down, as evidenced by the requirements of the specified
shutdown margin.
Acceptance Criteria
1. Shutdown margin of full core as loaded, under cold clean
conditions with the most reactive shim blade and regulating
rod withdrawn is 1% Ak/k or more.
2. Sufficient excess reactivity exists to conduct planned
operations. Critical shim bank height above 7.5 inches.
Results
1. The reactor was made critical on March 9, 1976. Refueling
continued until the final configuration of 22 fuel elements
and 5 solid dummies was achieved.
2. The reactor was always within the shutdown capability
requirements.
3. The 22 element core-shim bank critical height was 8.6 inches.
4. With no fixed absorbers, the reactivity worth of a solid
dummy in B-2, B-5, or B-8 was 1.76% Ak/k. The worth of a
solid dummy in B-3, B-6, or B-9 was 0.6% Ak/k. In order
to reduce the reactivity worth of the solid dummies and to.
reduce power peaking at the water gaps created by remeving
the fixed absorbers, the solid dummies in the B-ring were
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loaded into B-3, B-6, and B-9.
The 22 element core with no fixed absorbers is hereafter
called Core II. The following start-up tests were repeated
with the new core:
1. Shim blade calibrations,
2. Control worth of D20 Reflector Level,
3. Overall Temperature Coefficient Measurement,
4. Limited Power mapping,
5. Flow mapping.
The results of these tests are included in Section 4.
After satisfactory completion of the low power testing
and power step tests, Core II was operated in a "normal
operating" steady state routine at 2.5 Mw with one primary
pump (1100 gpm) coolant flow. This operation was continued
from the Spring of 1976 until November 1, 1976. During this
Core II operating period the following approved design changes
were made in the MITR-II system:
1. The aluminum-clad cadmium control blades were replaced
with stainless steel blades containing 1% natural
boron; reactivity effectiveness of the new boron-
stainless steel blades was measured to be nearly
exactly the same as the reactivity worth of the
cadmium blades.
2. The natural convection circulation check valves were
modified to have a stainless steel valve seat of
slightly different size to prevent valve sticking
problems.
3. An aluminum flow guide was installed above the core
to guide the core exit flow away from the raised con-
trol blades thus preventing the flow induced power
fluctuations. Tests were made which proved that the
previously observed fluctuations, with two primary
pump (2000 gpm) flow, were alleviated by the addition
of the flow guide and that two pump operation testing
up to 5.0 Mw could therefore be approved.
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4. A new upper spider, (the fuel separator in the upper
part of the core which contains the fixed absorbers)
was designed to hold hafnium absorber strips and a
new upper grid plate was designed to allow changing
the hafnium absorbers in the future without requiring
a complete core dismantling. The hafnium absorbers
were purchased and the new spider and grid plate were
fabricated prior to the conclusion of the Core II
operating period.
After all of the above preparations were completed, in-
cluding written and approved procedures, the reactor was
shutdown for the planned revision to the core. The fuel was
transferred to the fuel storage rack in the core tank and the
core dismantled. The new spider, upper grid, and hafnium
absorbers were installed, core components were reassembled
and appropriate pre-operational testing, such as control
blade drop time tests were satisfactorily completed in prep-
aration for the new fuel loading. Loading to Core III is
described below under procedure 5.1.5.
5.1.5 - Fuel Loading After Addition
of Hafnium Absorbers
Purpose
Same as procedure 5.1.4.
Acceptance Criteria
1. Shutdown margin of full core as loaded under cold clean
conditions,with most reactive shim blade and regulating
rod withdrawnis 1% Ak/k or more.
2. Sufficient excess reactivity exists to conduct planned
operations. Critical shim bank height above 6.0 inches.
Results
1. The reactor was made just (all control absorbers essen-
tially out) critical on November 9, 1976 with 22 elements
and three solid aluminum dummies. Fuel loading was con-
tained until the final configuration was achieved with two
solid dummies (in A-1 and A-3) and 25 fuel elements loaded.
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2. Reactor operation was always within the shutdown capability
requirements.
3. The 25 element Core III shim bank critical height was
7.72 inches with the regulating rod full in.
4. A test was made on the effect of rotating elements in
the C-ring to see if Core II burnup had an appreciable
non-symmetric effect on the reactivity. The 180* rota-
tion made a negligible effect on the core reactivity.
The following start-up tests were completed with Core III
and the results of these tests are summarized in Section 4:
1. Regulating Rod Calibrations with the 24 element core
and the 25 element core.
2. Calibration of Shim Blade No. 3.
3. Reactivity test on the effectiveness of individual
hafnium inserts.
Core III was found to be nearly identical to Core I with
respect to its operating and reactivity characteristics.
(This is in agreement with prior core design calculated pre-
dictions), and hence, Core III is predicted to be a configur-
ation of the MITR-II that can be operated up to 5.0 Mw if
desired.
However, prior to operating Core III above the low power
testing it was decided to again remove the fixed absorbers,
this time in order to provide additional excess reactivity
for more in-core irradiation facilities. The flexibility
of the MITR-II core design allows the core configuration to
be optimized for the reactor utilization. At this time the
utilization seems more concentrated on in-core facilities
and hence, the revision of the core design was made at the
expense of some reduction in the available flux in out-of-
core facilities and beam parts. The revised core design is
essentially a refueling of Core II with the new upper spider,
grid plate and core exit flow guide installed. The following
procedure (entitled Addendum 1 to Procedure 5.1.4) was used
to revise the core loading.
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Addendum 1 to 5.1.4
Special Fuel Loading Procedure
Purpose
To change the core loading from Core III to Core IV by
the addition of two solid aluminum dummies and the removal
of the fixed hafnium inserts. (Core IV contains 23 fuel
elements and 4 unfueled positions.)
Acceptance Criteria
The acceptance criteria were written into the procedure
to be:
1. Shutdown margin under all cold clean loading conditions
with most reactive shim blade and regulating rod with-
drawn is 1% Ak/k or more.
2. The core, when reloaded in the same configuration as
Core II, is to have the same critical condition as ex-
pected from Core II operating data within + 0.5a.
3. Critical shim bank height of the fully loaded core to be
greater than 6.5 inches.
The procedure involved partial fuel removal prior to re-
moval of the hafnium inserts and then reloading in an approach
to the desired core configuration with the appropriate checks
on the shutdown margin.
Results
1. Core IV when loaded to the point of 5 solid dummies and
22 fuel elements (i.e. Core II configuration) was shown
to have the expected Core II reactivity within 0.41$.
2. Core IV was made critical with 4 solid dummies in positions
requested for in-core irradiation facilities (A-1, A-3, B-2
and B-4) and 23 fuel assemblies on November 17, 1976.
3. Reactor operation was always with the shutdown capability
requirements.
4. The 23 element Core IV shim bank critical height was 7.3
inches.
After satisfactory completion of the Core IV fuel loading
procedure, the following start-up experiments were conducted:
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1. Regulating Rod Calibration
2. Shim blades No. 2 and No. 4 calibration and all shim
blade intercomparisons.
3. Stability of Reactor Control at low power with normal
Primary Coolant Flow (Procecure 5.2.3, Addendum No. 1)
4. Water Void Coefficient Between Fuel Plates
(Procedure 5.4.5)
5. Measurement of Uniform Temperature Coefficient
(Procedure 5.6.1, Addendum No. 1)
6. Procedure for Irradiating Cu Wires in Fuel Positions
(Procedure 5.9.1, Addendum -No. 1 and No. 2)
7. Neutron Flux Mapping (Plate Scan) (Procedure 5.9.1,
Addendum No. 3)
8. Flow Mapping (Procedure 5.9.2, Addendum No. 1)
9. Stepwise Rise to 2.5 Mw (Procedure 5.10.1, Addendum No. 1)
10. Stepwise Rise to 4.9 Mw (Procedure 5.10.1, Addendum No. 2)
11. Radiation Surveys and Shielding Evaluation (Procedure 5.10.2,
Addendum No. 1)
12. Instrument Adjustment and Calibration (Procedure 5.10.3
done as part of 5.10.1)
13. Fission Product Poisoning Measurement (Xenon Transient
Procedure 5.10.4)
14. Scram Check from Full Power (Procedure 5.10.5, Addendum
No. 1)
15. Natural Convective Heat Removal during Transient following
loss of Coolant Flow (Procedure 5.11.2)
The results of these tests are included in Section 4,
i.e. the next section of this report.
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4. Summary of Start-up Experiments and Stepwise Power Tests
Start-up tests were those tests conducted to verify that
(1) operation of the reactor would be in compliance with the
requirements of the Technical Specifications and Safety Analy-
sis Report and (2) to give the MITR staff a good understanding
of the operating characteristics of the reactor.
Start-up procedures for MITR-II were prepared by various
sources; reactor supervisors, technical assistants, operators,
etc. Class A procedures, defined in the MITR-II Procedure
Manual, Section 1.4, were reviewed, approved, and changed as
described below. Start-up Test procedures consisted of the
Purpose, Specifications, Acceptance Criteria, Special Test
Equipment, Special Precautions and a Test Summary. The Start-
up Test procedures which were Class A did not contain the
executable steps. Executable steps were contained in sub-
procedures, which were in effect detailed checklists. The sub-
procedures were Class B and were reviewed and approved accord-
ingly.
Procedures were prepared, distributed under cover of a
Safety Review Form to required parties, and comments received.
The procedure and significant comments from all three parties
were reviewed by all three parties so that each is aware of the
comments. The procedure was then typed in final form and routed
with the Safety Review Form for signatures. Then signatures
were received, the procedure was submitted to the MIT Reactor
Safeguards Committee for review and approval. When approved,
the procedure was released for execution. Subprocedures were
routed under Safety Review Forms.
Start-up Tests for MITR-II were conducted only by or under
the supervision of licensed operators assisted by the exper-
ienced staff, maintenance personnel and RPO personnel as re-
quired. The test results were reviewed for acceptance in
terms of completeness and validity within the accuracy required
to show whether or not specifications were satisfactorily met.
Start-up tests required "verification" of steps. This
meant that the person signing the step had actually performed
the step himself or was in a position to obse-rve the actions
taken and results of the action.
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The start-up procedures 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, and 5.1.4
used for initial fuel loadings are summarized in this sec-
tion.
4.1 Shim Blade and Regulating Rod Calibrations
The regulating rod was calibrated by period testing
techniques for several core arrangements during the start-
up experiments. Standard techniques of intercomparison be-
tween the shim blades and the calibrated regulating rod were
used to calibrate the shim blades. The speed of the regu-
lating rod and shim blades was determined during pre-operational
testing.
4.1.1 Regulating Rod Calibration
The regulating was calibrated using Ftart-up procedure
5.2.1. The following is a summary of procedure 5.2.1.
5.2.1 - Regulating Rod Calibration
Purpose
To provide regulating rod calibration in terms of
reactivity worth, as a function of position.
Acceptance Criteria
1. The reactivity worth of the regulating rod connected to
the automatic control system shall be less than 0.7% Ak/k.
2. Maximum rate of reactivity addition is no more than
5 x 10~4 Ak/k per second.
Results
The regulating rod was successfully calibrated for Core I,
Core II, Core III and Core IV. The results are summarized as
follows.
The worth of the regulating rod is strongly dependent
upon the position of the critical shim bank height.
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Shim Bank Height
For Core I Integral Reg. Rod Worth (ma)
7.5" 170
11.0" 252
16.8" 342
For Core II
8.5" 290
11. 7" 410
For Core III
7.7". 172
11.0" 280
For Core IV
7.3" 230
In all cases the integral worth is well below the limit
of 0.7% Ak/k (890 mS) also, the maximum differential worth
occurs near the bottom of the regulating rod travel and is
less sensitive to the shim bank position. Maximum measured
differential values occurred for Core I and II which when
combined with the measured regulating rod speed of 4.25 inches/
min. gives the maximum measured insertion rate of 3.5 mB/sec.
or 0.22(10) 4 Ak/k/sec. This is more than a factor of 10
below the limit of 5(10)~4 Ak/k/sec.
Thus, the acceptance criteria were satisfied and cali-
bration curves are available for operator use.
4.1.2 Shim Blade Calibrations
The shim blades were calibrated using start-up procedure
5.2.2. Procedure 5.2.2 is summarized as follows:
5.2.2 - Shim Blade Calibrations
Purpose
To provide shim blade calibrations in terms of reactivity
worth as a function of position.
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Acceptance Criteria
1. An integral reactivity worth curve for the individual
shim blades and the bank is established for the initial
operating range of the shim blade system.
2. Maximum rate of reactivity addition is no more than
+5.4 x 10~4 Ak/k per second.
Results
The shim bank and individual blades were calibrated for
Core I, Core II and Core IV; Core III was not completely
calibrated but found to be similar to Core I. The results
are summarized as follows.
The estimated worth of the shim bank, based on the measure-
ments, is approximately 17 to 20 for all four cores. The
maximum reactivity insertion rate for an individual blade is
summarized below:
Core I Core II Core IV
Maximum 18.2 ma/sec. 14.1 mW/sec. 15.6 ma/sec.
reactivity or or or
rate 1.4x10 Ak/k/sec. 1.lxlO~ Ak/k/sec. 1.2x10~ Ak/k/sec.
The initial cadmium shim blades satisfied the acceptance
criteria. Because of swelling of the cadmium sandwiches which
formed the shim blades, new 1% natural boron-stainless blades
were fabricated and installed to replace the cadmium blades.
The boron-stainless steel blades performed in an identical manner
as the cadmium blades and met the shim blade acceptance criteria
and calibration curves are available for operator use.
4.2 Stability of Reactor Control With Normal Primary Coolant
Flow
The stability of reactor control with normal primary flow
was tested using start-up procedure 5.2.3. Procedure 5.2.3 is
summarized as follows:
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5.2.3 - Stability of Reactor Control With
Normal Primary Coolant Flow
Purpose
To assess the stability of reactor neutron flux level
below the power range with normal coolant flow but absorbers
motionless, i.e. not under automatic control.
Acceptance Criteria
Power fluctuations with normal primary coolant flow under
steady state low power conditions are measured to be less than
+ 5% compared to the no flow condition.
Results
1. At low powers, the flow off and flow on power level fluct-
uations appeared to be the same within the rather broad
band indicated by the recorder at the given power level.
2. In Core I, there is a difference in shim bank height corres-
ponding to ~ 300 mO reactivity change due to the fuel rise
(within the allowed tolerances) with flow on; this effect
seems to be smaller in Core IV.
While this test was satisfactorily completed for Core I
at low power, flow induced power fluctuations were later dis-
covered during escallation to full power. As a result, the
reactor was operated at powers less than 2.5 Mw pending install-
ation of a flow guide. After installation of the flow guide,
the stability tests at full flow and power levels up to 2.5 Mw
were repeated and found to be well within the acceptance
criteria for Core II.
The flow stability test at low power was repeated for Core
IV and found acceptable and remained acceptable during operation
up to full (4.9 Mw) power.
4.3 Calibration of Control Worth of D20 Reflector
The change in the critical condition as a function of the
heavy water level was measured in terms of a change in the
position of the shim blades and by subcritical counting data.
The calibration of the control worth of the D20 reflector was
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performed using start-up procedure 5.3. Procedure 5.3 is
summarized as follows:
5.3 - Control Worth of D20 Reflector Level
Purpose
To determine the reactivity worth of the D20 reflector
as a function of level throughout the control range, and if
necessary to adjust the reflector dump tank operating level
so that shutdown margin requirements will be met.
Acceptance Criteria
The reactivity worth of the reflector dump shall be greater
than the worth of the most reactive shim blade.
Results
The reactivity worth of the D20 reflector was determined
for both Core I and Core II. The results are summarized as
follows:
Core I Core II
Estimated 9 a or 15 8 or
Worth of 7% Ak/k 11% Ak/k
Reflector
Dump
These values of the worth of the reflector dump are
based on critical shim bank height changes for about half the
total and combined with subcritical count rate data for the
remaining half.
The acceptance criteria was easily met since the most
reactive shim blade is worth -3-4 8 for Core I and Core II.
4.4 Void Coefficient Measurements
Measurements were made of the effect of displacing mod-
erator at the following positions:
1. Between the fuel plates of the fuel elements for
Core I and Core IV,
2. In H20 moderator at the edge of the core for Core I,
3. In D20 reflector (blister tank) for Core I,
4. In graphite reflector for Core I.
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4.4.1 Water Void Coefficient Between Fuel Plates
The H20 void coefficient between fuel plates was measured
using Start-up Procedure 5.4.1. Procedure 5.4.1 is summarized
as follows:
5.4.1 - Water Void Coefficient
Between Fuel Plates
Purpose
To determine the void coefficient of reactivity for voids
in the fueled region of the core by displacing water with
aluminum plates.
Acceptance Criteria
The average void coefficient in the active core region
must be negative. The magnitude of the void coefficient is to
be used to check that maximum safe step reactivity insertion is
1.8% Ak/k or greater, or to establish a new reactivity limit
if the safe step is evaluated to be less than 1.8% Ak/k.
Results
The measured average void coefficient for H20 between the
fuel plates are as follows:
Average Void Coefficient
Bottom 6 Inch Length
Full Channel of Fuel
Core I
A-ring -2.73 ma/cm 3 -3.47 m/cm 3
B-ring -2.72 m8/cm 3  -3.53 mS/cm3
C-ring -1.64 mW/cm 3  -1.88 mW/cm3
24 element core 3
average -2.05 ma/cm3  -2.49 ma/cm
or
-2.0(10)-5 Ak/k/cm 3
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Core IV
A-ring
B-ring
C-ring
23 element core
average
Full Channel
- 1.98 ma/cm 3
- 1.92 ma/cm 3
- 1.55 ma/cm 3
- 1.68 mW/cm3
The limiting step reactivity insertion for the MITR-II core is
determined by Equation 15.2.8 in the SAR.
be written as:
at +
L 1 + at
where
a = 214.1 (C/k)
0
.
337
C = void coef. in Ak/k/cm 3
Z = neutron lifetime in sec.
a = delayed neutron fraction
From Tolga Yarman's thesis:
a = 0.00786,
k = 1.0 x 10~4 sec.
Equation 15.2.8 can
(Confirmed by measurement assuming
a = 0.00786)
Solving the above equation using the measured void co-
efficients, the limiting reactivity insertions would be:
Core I
Full Channel
1.92% Ak/k
p Limiting
or 2.44 8
Core I
Bottom 6-inch
length of fuel
2.00% Ak/k
or 2.54 8
Core IV
1.84% k/k
or 2.34 a
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Thus the acceptance criteria which was based on the
Technical Specification limit was satisfied. (Note that the
limit as established by the Technical Specifications is
based on operation with fixed absorber inserts such as in
Core I& when the inserts are removed, as in Core IV, a new
limit could be justified that is less restrictive than 1.8%
and still be within the basic safety criteria.)
4.4.2 H 20 Void Coefficient at the Edge of the Core
The water void coefficient at the edge of the core was
measured using start-up procedure 5.4.2. Procedure 5.4.3 is
summarized as follows:
5.4.2 - H20 Coefficient at the
Edge of the Core
Purpose
To measure the void coefficient in the core housing area
by creating a void in one of the corner holes.
Acceptance Criteria
A value of void coefficient is measured.
Results
Measurement was made in the water hole (for control blade
water displacement) at the edge of the core in the core housing
next to position C-8. A cylindrical void, 10" in length by
3/8" in diameter, was positioned at the bottom of the corner
hole. The measured average void coefficient was +0.28 m /cm3
or +2.2 x 10- 6 Ak/k/cm 3.
4.4.3 DO Reflector Void Coefficient (Blister Tank)
The effect of D20 changes in the blister tank were
evaluated using start-up procedure 5.4.3. Procedure 5.4.3 is
summarized as follows:
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5.4.3 - D20 Reflector Void Coefficient of
Reactivity (Blister Tank)
Purpose
To determine the change in reactivity of the reactor
per unit level change in the blister tank and adjust rate
of change of level, if necessary.
Acceptance Criteria
1. Reactivity change due to complete draining or refueling
of blister tank is equal to or less than 0.2% Ak/k.
2. Reactivity addition rate due to refilling blister tank is
5.0 x 10~4 Ak/k per second or less.
Results
The reactivi'ty worth of the blister tank was measured
by draining the blister tank in steps and compensating with
the calibrated regulating rod. The refill rate was also
measured as a function of time. The results are summarized
as follows:
1. The total reactivity loss on opening (draining) the
Thus
shutter is 70 m8 or 0.055% Ak/k.
2. The maximum rate of reactivity insertion on refilling
the shutter is 1.5 x 10- 6 Ak/k/sec.
the acceptance criteria were satisfied.
4.4.4 Graphite Reflector Void Coefficient
The graphite void coefficient was measured using start-up
procedure 5.4.4. Procedure 5.4.4 is summarized as follows:
5.4.4 - Graphite Reflector Void Coefficient
Purpose
To measure the void coefficient of void spaces within
the graphite reflector surrounding the reflector tank.
Acceptance Criteria
A measured value of graphite reflector void coefficient
is obtained. (No value is specified or required. However, it
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is expected that the value will be negative and small com-
pared to the void coefficient in the core of reflector tank.)
Results
The test was completed by inserting and then removing a
cylindrical graphite plug (3" diameter x 12" length) in 3GV4.
The volume of the plug was 1.38 liters. The average graphite
void coefficient for removal of the plug was -4.6 m$/liter
= -3.6 x 10-8 Ak/k/cm3
4.5 Effective Neutron Lifetime Measurement
The effective neutron lifetime of the MITR-II was deter-
mined using start-up procedure 5.5.1 which is summarized as
follows:
5.5.1 - Effective Neutron Lifetime Measurement
Purpose
To check the value of effective neutron lifetime used in
the core design. It will be assumed that the design values of
delayed neutron fractions and half lives are accurate, and that
the weighting of them at different periods can be taken from
the design basis in-hour equation. Thus this test will serve
to measure the error in effective neutron lifetime.
Acceptance Criteria
A measured value of the effective neutron lifetime is
derived together with a consistent value of the effective
delayed neutron fraction and these values are used in the final
MITR-II in-hour relation and the evaluation of the safe step
reactivity insertion.
Results
The original method of measuring the effective neutron
lifetime by period measurements was not sensitive enough to
determine the lifetime. A noise analysis was then used which
gave satisfactory results. Using 0.00786 as the consistent
value of the effective delayed neutron fraction, the measured
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value of the effective neutron lifetime was 1.0 x 10~4 second
and thus the acceptance criteria were met.
4.6 Temperature Coefficient Measurements
The uniform temperature coefficient measurement was made
by circulating externally heated water through the core (pump
heat used to raise water temperature) to vary the temperature
of the reactor core. Measurements were made by changing the
H20 temperature and D20 temperature separately to evaluate
the primary H20 and reflector temperature coefficients. Be-
cause of the thermal communication between these two systems
at the core tank interface complete decoupling was very
difficult. The temperature coefficient measurements were made
using start-up procedures 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 which are summarized
as follows:
5.6.1 - Core Tank and Primary
H20 System Temperature
Coefficient of
Reactivity
5.6.2 - Temperature Coefficient
of Reactivity of Re-
flector Water
Purpose
To measure temperature
coefficient of reactivity
of the primary water
system
To measure the temper-
ature coefficient of
reactivity of the
reflector system
Acceptance Criteria
The temperature co-
efficient of the core
is estimated to be
negative
The temperature co-
efficient of the D20
is measured
Results
The following temperature coefficients were measured:
Applicable Temperature
Temperature Coefficient (ma/*C) Range
H20
Core I -3.4
-3.7
Combined
+1.6
-6.5
260 - 290C
260 - 380C
210 - 28 0 C
350 - 45*C
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Applicable Temperature
Temperature Coefficient (m8/*C) Range
H!20 D220 Combined
Core II -2.6 310 - 320 C
-5.9 370 - 380 C
Core IV +2 to 0 150 - 200C
0 to -6 200 - 300C Low power
-6 to -12 30* - 400 C tests by
-12 to -18 40* - 50*C pump heat
-5 + 1 400 - 480C I Full power,
xenon equili-
brium test,
temperature
changed by
changing sec-
ondary system
cooling (cool-
ing tower)
At low temperatures (below 20*C) the clean Core IV uniform
temperature coefficient appears to become nearly zero or slightly
positive. Since the reactor can not be operated at power in
this temperature range, this does not cause an operating problem
and in any case the available reactivity from a temperature
change in the region of the positive coefficient is very small.
(Note that the D20 temperature coefficient is positive and adds
to the primary system coefficient in the uniform measurement, if
a separate temperature coefficient of the core only could be made,
it is expected that it may be negative below 200C since the core
is undermoderated.)
Because in all measured cases the primary system temper-
ature coefficient was negative, over the expected operating
range, the acceptance criteria was satisfied.
4.7 Fuel Removal Experiments
Fuel removal experiments were performed by replacing entire
fuel elements with a non-fueled element and by utilizing a
special element made with removable fuel plates. The removable
fuel plates were either replaced with blank aluminum plates or
water gaps were left where the fuel plates were removed. Fuel
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removal experiments were performed using start-up procedure
5.7.1 which is summarized as follows:
5.7.1 - Fuel Removal Measurements
Purpose
To measure the reactivity worth of individual fuel
plates and U-235 in fuel plates at various locations in the
core.
Acceptance Criteria
Values of the reactivity worth of fuel plates and fuel
meat are measured.
Results
1. Fuel element replaced with non-fueled element (001)
23 Element Core I Con-
figuration With Non-
fueled Element Loaded In
A-2
B-5
B-4
C-6
C-7
C-8
Ap(ma)
4070
2190
2690
2120
1960
2200
445gms-U-235/element
Ap
,M m8/gm U-235
9.15
4.92
6.04
4.76
4.40
4.94
2. One fuel plate in element replaced by aluminum plate
(Core I configuration)
Position of
Element With
Plate Replaced
A-2
B-4
C-8
Ap
(m)
-157
-132
Ap
ANI (mS/g-U-235)
-5.27
-4.47
-60 -2.03
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3. Two fuel plates removed and water gap left (Core I con-
figuration)
Position of
Element With
Plates Removed
A-2
B-4
B-5
C-6
C-7
Ap
(ma)
+91
+169
+226
+85
+109
8AO (ma/g-U-255)
AM
+1.53
+2.86
+3.80
+1.43
+1.84
4.8 General Reactivity Studies
Sufficient reactivity measurements were taken for an
understanding of the experimental facilities. The effective
neutron lifetime was measured in an earlier section and the
worth of fissionable material in the core was measured during
fuel removal experiments. General reactivity studies were
performed under start-up procedure 5.8.1. Results of procedure
5.8.1 are summarized as follows:
5.8.1 - Reactivity Studies - Summary
1. Experimental Facility Shutters (Core I)
Acceptance Criterion:
Rate of reactivity addition <5 x 10~4 Ak/k sec.
Facility Ap(mO) Ak/k/sec. Proced. No.
Thermal Column:
Medical Room:
Cd Shutter
Steel Doors
H20 Shutter
Boral Shutter
Lead Shutter
D20 Blister
1.4
0
5 x 10~7
3.4 1.3 x 10-6
0 -
0 -
68 1.5 x 10-6
5.8
5.8
5.8
5.8
5.8
5.4.3
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2. Materials in Experimental Facilities (Core I)
Acceptance Criterion:
For single movable experiments <0.2% Ak/k (254 ma)
(upon
Material Facility Ap insertion) Procedure
93% U-235 Core A-ring +9.7 ma/gm U-235 5.7.1
(no H20 Core B-ring +5.1-6.4 " "
displaced) Core C-ring +4.5-5.1 " "
93% U-235 6RH2 +7.0 it 5.8
Cadmium lPH2, 1PH4 0 m8/cm 2  5.5
(total exposed 3GV6 -0.22 " 5.5
surface) 6RH2 
-1.2 " 5.8
Polyethylene 3GV4 (bottom) + 0.075 mW/cm 3  5.8
6RH2 + 0.012 " 5.8
Graphite 3GV4 + 0.0046 " 5.4.3
4.9 Neutron Flux and Core Power Mapping
Gamma scans of the fission products in removable fuel
plates in a special fuel element were made for Core I and
Core II. The fuel element with removable plates was irrad-
iated in various locations throughout the core and these
gamma scans were made shortly after each irradiation. Proper
normalization and background corrections were made so that the
gamma scans could be used to develop a relative power dis-
tribution plot over the entire core. The radial and axial
power peaking factors were compared to design calculations
and the experimentally derived power distributions were used
to re-evaluate the predicted fuel plate temperatures for full
power operation.
Neutron flux and core power mapping was performed using
start-up procedure 5.9.1. The purpose of procedure 5.9.1
was to determine values of Fr, F a, FHC, and Fp together with
an estimate of experimental uncertainty where Fr, Fa, FHC'
and F are defined as:
p
F is the fraction of the total power generated by
the fuel,
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FHC is the hot channel factor, the ratio of the power re-
leased into the hottest coolant channel over the
average (radial) channel power,
Fr is the radial power peaking factor; the ratio of the
power produced in the fuel plate with the hot spot to
the power produced in the average fuel plate,
Fa is the axial power peaking factor, the ratio of the
power density at the location of the hot spot to the
average power density in that fuel plate.
In addition, an uncertainty factor of 1.55 as described
in the Technical Specifications is included in the following
evaluation.
These factors were used to verify that the safety limit
factor (SLF) and the operating limit equation (OLE) which are
shown below were within the limits required by the Technical
Specifications before operation above 1.0 Kw was allowed.
The SLF and OLE for Core I and Core II complied with the
following limits before operation above 1.0 Kw was allowed:
SLF E FHC F P < 2.9,
/F FfZ PTFrFq 0.466
OLE -- T G + FRp F r - 1 -2.77 PA J <3.72LWI f Ff J L
The results of the neutron flux and core power mapping for the
initial reactor cores are contained in "The Reactor Engineering
of the MITR-II Construction and Start-up", by G. C. Allen, Jr.,
L. Clark, Jr., J. W. Gosnell, and D. D. Lanning, MITNE-186.
For Core IV, a combination of flux mapping experiments,
largely made by using copper wires irradiated at various fuel
element positions, and three dimensional computer calculation
were used to show that the SLF and OLE requirements were satis-
fied. The computer code, CITATION, was used with corrections
to provide agreement with previous experimental results. The
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power distributions so derived were used as described above
together with the uncertainty factor to conservatively show
that the core will meet the limits.
4.10 Stepwise Rise to 5 Mw Operation
Prior to operation above 100 Kw, all process systems and
radiation monitoring systems on the process systems were put
into their normal operating condition with scram bypasses re-
moved and instruments checked out and calibrated. Relative
flows through each fuel element had been checked prior to
operation above 1.0 Kw using start-up procedure 5.9.2 for
primary flow rates corresponding to one and two pump oper-
ation. Procedure 5.9.2 is summarized as follows:
5.9.2 - Flow Mapping
Purpose
Determine the relative follow through each fuel element
position for one and two pump operation and determine the
fraction of primary coolant flow that cools the core.
Acceptance Criteria
Values of df and Ff shall be determined with an estimate
of experimental uncertainty where df and Ff are defined as:
df is the flow disparity in the channel with the highest
fuel clad temperature,
Ff is the fraction of primary flow cooling the fuel.
Results
1. The flow disparity for each channel in the initial core
was determined together with an estimate of their uncertainty.
2. Provided that a sample assembly with restricted flow or a
solid dummy element are loaded in an A-ring position, the
minimum value of df occurs in a C-ring position and was
approximately 0.93 for all core loadings. (Measurements
were made in Core I, Core II and Core IV.)
3. The flow disparity was greater for the two pump case than
the one pump case.
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4. The amount of coolant flow that bypasses the core is
very dependent on the number of solid dummies and exper-
imental facilities located in the core. For Core I, the
bypass flow was about 6% and for Core II, the bypass was
8%.
The relative flow measurements together with the previously
described core power mapping were used to verify that the core
factor equations which composed the safety limit and limiting
condition for operation as defined in the technical specifica-
tions were acceptable for full power operation.
Also, prior to raising the reactor power above 100 Kw, the
reactor was checked to assure that all experimental materials
used in low power testing were removed and that proper shielding
had been installed around beamports, the thermal column, and the
reactor top. The ventilation system had been checked during
pre-operational testing to insure proper air flow. The CO2
purge system was started, and reactor seals were checked to
reduce the potential for A41 production and release.
In preparation for the stepwise power escalation, special
chromel-alumel thermo-couples were installed in and above the
core. One fuel element had been fabricated with 0.010 inch
diameter stainless steel clad thermo-couples staked to the
surface of the fuel plates. Other stainless steel clad thermo-
couples were installed to measure the fuel element coolant inlet
temperature and selected fuel coolant outlet temperatures. More
details on the use of these thermo-couples to determine the core
temperatures are given in MITNE 186, where the results of tem-
perature measurements for Core I and Core II operation is also
described. Similar measurements were also made for the step-
wise operation of Core IV. Procedures 5.10 and 5.11 were used
for the stepwise rise. The Core IV results of these procedures
are summarized after the following listing of the procedure
titles and acceptance criteria:
5.10 - Stepwise Rise to 5 Mw
Purpose
1. To determine the operating values of system parameters.
2. To verify design estimates of these parameters.
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3. To determine any neutron channel non-linearities.
5.10.1 - Temperature Distribution
Acceptance Criteria
1. Measured fuel plate temperatures are equal to or less
than those calculated in Section 3 of the SAR.
2. Temperatures in the reflector tank are less than 550C
and minimum flow requirements are established.
3. Temperatures in the graphite region are equal to or less
than those in the MITR-I.
4. Temperature of Medical Water Shutter less than 70*C and
minimum flow requirements established.
5. Temperature of D20 blister tank less than 600 C.
5.10.2 - Radiation Surveys and
Shielding Evaluation
Acceptance Criteria
To determine that personnel will not be exposed un-
necessarily to radiation and to insure that non-occupational
and occupational radiation exposure is as low as practicable.
5.10.3 - Instrument Adjustment and Calibrations
Acceptance Criteria
1. Neutron channels checked for linearity and calibrated
against thermal power.
2. Automatic control system operates satisfactorily.
3. Radiation monitor trip settings established.
5.10.4 - Fission Product Poisoning Measurements
Acceptance Criteria
1. Xe poisoning buildup and decay curves determined for 5 Mw
operation.
2. Initial reactivity effect of U-235 burnout and Samarium
poisoning determined.
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5.10.5 - Scram Check
Acceptance Criteria
Nuclear Safety system operates satisfactorily at full
power.
5.11 - Natural Convection Heat Removal
Purpose
To verify that the maximum expected decay heat can be
satisfactorily removed by natural convection after a loss
of induced flow.
5.11.1 - Natural Convective Heat Removal
of Equivalent to Decay Power
Acceptance Criteria
Maximum fuel element surface temperature as calculated
from measured surface temperatures shall not exceed that re-
quired for incipient boiling.
5.11.2 - Natural Convective Heat Removal During
Transient Following Loss of Coolant Flow
(to be done concurrently with Procedure 5.10)
Acceptance Criteria
- Maximum fuel element surface temperature, as calculated
from measured surface temperature, shall not exceed 300*C.
Results
Procedure 5.11.1 was followed first (below 100 Kw) as
planned, in order to check that the natural convection cooling
system does operate as predicted and to prove this satisfactory
operation before a significant fission product decay heat load
was built up by higher power operation. Procedure 5.11.1 was
carried out on Core I. The procedure involved stepwise power
increases below 100 Kw with primary coolant pump off to measure
the coolant and fuel plate temperatures with natural convection
cooling. Conservative estimates of the thermal power were
-72-
used for initial steps and trip settings. After reasonably
measurable temperature rises were detected (in the range
of 10 to 40 Kw) a better calibration of the systems was
attempted based on the natural convection cooling. However,
this method had large uncertainties due to efforts such as
chimney effects above the core and no direct measurement of
the flow rate through the core. Therefore, the sub-committee
of the MITR Safeguards Committee approved operation above
100 Kw with a primary pump operating so that a good power
calibration could be obtained by operation at approximately
1.0 Mw. The operating power was chosen such that the early
natural convection could be used as proof that the decay
heat would be adequately removed by natural convection in the
event of a shutdown due to loss of primary flow. After the
more accurate thermal power calibration of the instrumentation
was completed, then procedure 5.11.1 was again followed, step-
wise, to a power level of 80 Kw. This was sufficient to
extrapolate the measured temperatures up to 100 Kw and prove
that natural convective cooling meets the acceptance criteria.
After completion of the natural convection low power
tests, the stepwise power tests (Procedure 5.10) were initiated
with the combination of 5.11.2 natural convection transient
cooling tests after each power step. The data was taken at
each step and extrapolated ahead for approval of the next
step. The minimum steps required by the procedure were 1.0 Mw,
2.5 Mw and 4.9 Mw; however, in general, the power was raised
in 0.5 Mw steps and tests and data interpretation were carried
out at each step. Core I data was used as the primary source
of information for operation up to 2.5 Mw for Cores II and
IV, with some check step tests on Cores II and IV during
operation up to 2.5 Mw. Above 2.5 Mw all tests were repeated
for Core IV in 0.5 Mw steps up to 4.9 Mw operation. On
December 1, 1976, the reactor reached 4.9 Mw. The results of
these tests can be summarized as follows:
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1. Measured steady state fuel plate temperatures are equal
to or less than the predicted values. The maximum hot
spot fuel plate temperature (C-13 outside channel
8 inches up) as conservatively inferred from the measured
data is 90*C at 6 Mw, 1800 gpm and 60*C core average out-
let temperature. This power and these system values
are the technical specification, Limiting Safety System
Settings, and hence the hot spot is below nucleate
boiling under all allowable operating conditions.
2. Temperatures in the D20 reflector are easily controlled to
be well below 55*C. Satisfactory system flow conditions
have been established.
3. The measured graphite temperature (in 3GV6) is 175*C
after 17 hours at 4.8 Mw and 179*C after 4 days at 4.9 Mw.
This is well below the approximately 300*C graphite tem-
perature measured for MITR-I operation.
4. The Medical Water Shutter temperature was measured to
stay approximately equal to the primary coolant temper-
ature and was well below the 70*C criteria during 4.9 Mw
operation.
5. The D20 blister tank temperature is measured to be approx-
imately equal to the D20 reflector temperature and hence
is kept well below 60*C during 4.9 Mw operation.
6. Radiation surveys were taken and the acceptance criteria
has been satisfied. Dose rate levels and effluent
activities are similar to the MITR-I operating conditions
with the major exception of the equipment room N-16 dose
rates which are lower for MITR-II due to the longer decay
time in the core tank and piping.
7. Nuclear Safety channels are linear up to and through 4.9 Mw
operation as checked against thermal power calibrations.
The automatic control system has been adjusted to operate
satisfactorily. Radiation monitor trip settings have been
established.
-74-
8. The xenon transients of build-up to steady state and
transient peaking after shutdown from 4.9 Mw operation
have been measured. The steady state value agreed well
with predicted reactivity effects, however, the peak
xenon after shutdown was considerably lower than estim-
ated by simple one region calculations. This variation
from prediction does not cause any operating problem,
in fact it is a benefit when xenon override is required.
More sophisticated calculations are being made to better
understand the details of the shutdown transient.
Initial reactivity effects of burnup and samarium
poisoning have been measured and continued surveillance
of core reactivity during 4.9 Mw operation is in progress.
9. A scram check at full power was completed satisfactorily.
This was done by lowering the power to about 4 Mw, then
resetting the safety system scram below 5.0 Mw and then
slowly raising the power until the reactor was scrammed
by the safety system trips. The trip occurred at about
4.8 Mw and was in agreement with the preset current
reading for the. trip point.
10. Natural convection heat transfer has been shown to be
satisfactory for removal of decay heat after shutdown
due to loss of primary coolant flow at all power level
steps up to 4.9 Mw. The maximum fuel plate temperature
occur at 25 to 30 seconds after loss of flow and simul-
taneous scram. After operation at 4.9 Mw, the outlet of
the hottest channel (C-13 near outside) is conservatively
estimated from the measured data to be 96*C at the peak
of the temperature transient and in this case the max-
imum wall temperature may be a few -.10 to 15*C higher.
Since the incipient boiling temperature is near 107 0 C,
the surface may be approaching this temperature. These
results are almost in exact agreement with the predicted
natural convection cooling results. As discussed on
Page 15.15 of the MITR-II Safety Analysis Report
MITNE-115, the calculated temperature on loss of flow
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after 5 Mw operation were estimated to peak near the
boiling condition and the small amount of vapor bubbles
is expected to enhance the heat transfer coefficient.
The acceptance criteria on natural convective cooling
of decay heat from full power operation is therefore
satisfactorily met.
Conclusion
The MITR-II pre-operational and start-up tests have been
satisfactorily completed. The data have been reviewed by
MITR Operations and Radiation Protection Offices. The
acceptance criteria have been met and the results of the
testing have been discussed with the MIT Reactor Safeguards
Committee. On December 20, 1976, the MIT Reactor Safeguards
Committee approved continued normal operation at 4.9 Mw for
the MITR-II.
ADDroved: \
David D. Lanning
Lincoln Clark, Jr.
